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I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL BUILDING 
CORPORATION, 
P l a i n t i f f -
A p p e l l a n t , 
v s 
FRANK S . BLAIR a n d 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND 
LCftN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants-
Respondents, 
Case No. 14499 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Action by Plaintiff-Appellant, Commercial Building 
Corporation, (hereinafter called Commercial) alleging 
among other things violation of a provision of a lease 
with Defendant-Respondent, Frank S. Blair, by allowing 
a building and sign to be located on parking area, and 
seeking damages and an order prohibiting the use of 
property for* any purpose other than parking, right of 
way and driveway. Blair denied the violation and requested, 
among other things, a judgment and decree that the 
property not be restricted to parking, right of way and 
driveway uses. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, 
which were denied. 
The trial court found in favor of Blair and 
against Commercial, holding that the lease provision 
was vague and unclear and finding that the intention 
of the parties was that the location of the area for 
additional parking, right of way and driveway area was 
flexible and could be placed any where on the South 
half (approximately) of Blairs1 property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Blair asks the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment 
and decree of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1963 Commercial contacted Wallace R. Woodbury 
(hereinafter called Woodbury) an attorney and president 
of Woodbury Corporation, to have him locate a site 
for a new drive-in bank and to cancel an existing lease 
Commercial had with principals of Woodbury Corporation. 
Woodbury contacted Frank S. Blair and his relatives 
and negotiated for a lease on the Blair property. 
Woodbury dealt with Commercial and the Blairs as an 
-2-
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intermediary. He represented^both parties. 
The Blair property is located at the Northwest 
intersection of Harrison Blvd. and 36th Street in Ogden, 
being a parcel of land running West of Harrison West 
to Brinker and North from the 36th Street to the North 
line of Lots 13 and 36 (as extended). The property is 
composed of Lots 13 to 36, Nelson Park Addition, a 
vacated alley and lots designated as M and N. The 
following diagram represents the property: 
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An Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease Agreement 
was prepared by Woodbury dated July 16, 1963. The parking 
arrangement in the Earnest Money was not satisfactory 
to the Blairs and they refused to sign a lease with that 
provision. 
Woodbury continued to negotiate with the parties 
and eventually prepared the lease which contains the 
following provisions: 
"Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee 
hereby leases from Lessor the following 
described property in Weber County, State 
of Utah, hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as the 'Premisesf, to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 31 to 36, both 
inclusive, together with the East 10.5 feet 
of the vacated alley adjacent on the West, 
Block 26, Nelson Park Addition in Ogden 
City, being part of North half of Sections 
3 and 4, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Subject to joint use with other tenants of 
Lessor of parking area, rights of way and 
driveways other than drive-in window exits 
and approaches; 
PARCEL 2: Together with joint use, with 
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000 
square feet of additional parking area, 
right of way and driveway area located on 
Lots 25"to 30, inclusive of said Block 26, 
and upon property adjacent thereto on the 
West." 
Commercial constructed its drive-in bank on Parcel 
1 and the Blairs asphalted in excess of 20,000 square 
feet of additional parking and driveway approaches on 
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36th Street. In about 1973, Blair leased a part of the 
Southeast corner of Parcel 2 to American Savings & 
Loan, whereupon Commercial commenced this action. 
Blair has succeeded to the interest of his rela-
tives and Commercial Building Corporation has succeeded 
to the- interest of Commercial Security Bank. The 
structure of American Savings was temporary and has 
now been moved. 
Blair has continued to provide Commercial with at 
least 20,000 square feet of additional parking area, 
right of way and driveway area. 
POINT I 
-kickick ick 
THE LEASE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF MORE 
THAN ONE MEANING AND INTERPRETIVE 
EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW 
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
This case requires a construction of the following 
phrase in the lease: 
"PARCEL 2: Together with joint use with 
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000 
square feet of additional parking area, 
right of way and driveway area located on 
Lots 25 to 30, inclusive of said Block 
26, and upon property adjacent thereto on 
West." 
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Commercial claims that the 20,000 square feet of 
parking area, right of way and driveway area must 
utilize Lots 25 to 30, (19,500 square feet), and then 
to make up the balance of 20,000 square feet, land to the 
West thereof shall be utilized. Blair contends that 
the 20,000 square feet parking and easement areas may 
be located anywhere on the land described as Parcel 2. 
On the other hand, both parties agree that it was 
intended that Commercial should have right of way and 
driveway areas to and from 36th Street and that the 
areas on the plat designated as N should be included 
in Parcel 2. The parcel of Lots 25 to 30 and N has 
in excess of 20,000 square feet, therefore, there 
would be no reason to include in Parcel 2 property 
adjacent on the West if the 20,000 square feet was to 
be located exclusively on Lots 25 to 30 and N. 
Also, from a common sense point of view, this 
language could be construed to mean that the area of 
parking, right of way and driveway area may be taken 
from that land as described, to-wit: Lots 25 to 30, 
and property adjacent thereto on the West; the property 
to the West being the vacated alley and Lots 19 to 24; 
or from this land plus Lots M and N. 
~7-
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Being susceptible of more than one meaning, it 
was appropriate for the Court to receive interpretive 
evidence. 
Corbin on Contracts, Volume 3, Section 579: 
11
 No parole evidence that is offered can be 
said to varry or contradict a writing until 
by process of interpretation it is determined 
what the writing means. The 'parol evidence 
rule1 is not, and does not purport to be, a 
rule of interpretation or a rule as to the 
admission of evidence for the purpose of 
interpretation. Even if a written document 
has been assented to as the complete and 
accurate integration of the terms of a con-
tract, it must still be interpreted; and all 
those factors that are of assistance in this 
process may be proved by oral testimony. 
It is true that the language of some agree-
ments has been believed to be so plain and 
clear that the court needs no assistance in 
interpreting. Even in these cases, however, 
it will be found that the court has had the 
aid of parol evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances. The meaning to be discovered 
and applied is that which each party had reason 
to know would be given to the words by the 
other party. Antecedent and surrounding 
factors that throw light upon this question 
may be proved by any kind of relevant evidence. 
The more bizarre and unusual an asserted 
interpretation is, the more convincing must be 
the testimony that supports it. Just when the 
court should quit listening to testimony that 
white is black and that a dollar is fifty cents 
is a matter for sound judicial discretion 
and common sense. Even these things may be true 
for some purposes. As long as the court is 
aware that there may be doubt and ambiguity 
and uncertainty in the meaning and application 
-8-
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of agreed language, it will welcome testi-
mony as to antecedent agreements, communica-
tions, and other factors that may help to 
decide the issue. Such testimony does not 
vary or contradict the written words; it 
determines that which cannot be varied or 
contradicted.. .,f 
and in footnote 51: 
"In Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat. Bank, 154 
N.E.2d 683, 15 111.2d 272 (1958), a long, 
complex, and fully 'integrated* contract 
was executed after prolonged negotiation 
and correspondence. It granted to the 
plaintiff an option to purchase a majority 
of the shares and debentures of a corporation. 
It also contained one sentence which, standing 
alone, might be supposed to give to the 
defendant a power of revocation of the option. 
In an excellent opinion, the court held that 
extrinsic evidence, covering all the prelimin-
ary negotiations, was admissible to show the 
intention and purpose of the parties. In the 
light of this evidence, the court held that 
the single sentence should be given very 
limited effect, that the plaintiff's option 
was irrevocable, and that he was entitled to 
specific performance. The court said: 'In 
general, the intention of the parties is to be 
determined from the final agreement executed 
by them, rather than from preliminary 
negotiations and agreements; but previous 
agreements, negotiations and circumstances 
may be considered in determining the meaning 
of specific words and clauses. Similarly, 
under well recognized exceptions to the parol 
evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to show the meaning of words used in a 
contract where there is an ambiguity, or when 
the language is susceptible of more than one 
meaning.' The relevant meaning of all language 
always depends upon the entire context, the 
surrounding circumstances (necessarily 
antecedent and contemporaneous), and the 
habits and practices of its users." 
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To the same effect is Fayter v. North, et al, 
30 Utah 156, 83 Pacific 742; 
"...Whenever the terms of a written instrument 
are susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion, or a latent ambiguity arises, or the 
extent and object of the instrument cannot 
be ascertained from the language employed, 
parol evidence is admissible to show the sense 
which the contracting parties attached to the 
terms or language employed in the instrument; 
and for this purpose the acts and conversations 
of the parties, at or about and subsequent to 
the time of the transaction, relating to the 
subject matter, constitute proper evidence."... 
POINT II 
******** 
THE INTENTION WAS TO ALLOW LESSOR FLEXIBILITY 
IN LOCATING AN AREA OF 20,000 SQUARE FEET FOR 
PARKING, RIGHT OF WAY AND DRIVEWAY. 
Prior to being contacted by Woodbury, the Blairs 
had plans to develop their property into a shopping 
center project and had three studies made for such 
development. Thereafter there has been two or three 
more development plans made by Woodbury who has been 
working on layouts the last few years (R110). 
The Blairs regarded the Southeast corner as the 
most valuable (R79, R139). Commercial wanted that 
corner, but the Blairs were not willing to give it up 
and Commercial settled for a parcel to the North 
(Parcel 1) (R113). 
-10-
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After negotiating between the parties, Woodbury 
prepared an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease 
(dated July 16, 1963), which provides for Commercial 
to lease from Blairs property at: ' ;v 
"Approx. 3571 Harrison Blvd. (150* on 
Harrison to 140' depth at NE corner of 
Blair land)...Landlord to provide 
additional parking not less than 150* x 
140' adjacent on South to above parcel...11 
(Exhibit H) (21,000 square feet) 
The contingencies in the Earnest Money were not 
met and either party could have cancelled (R133). The 
parking arrangement in the Earnest Money was not 
satisfactory to the Blairs and they refused to sign 
a lease with that provision (R131,141,146). 
Woodbury continued his negotiations between the 
parties and then prepared the lease (signed in May 
of 1964) (Exhibit C) (R110), which contains the 
following provisions: 
"Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee 
hereby leases from Lessor the following 
described property in Weber County, State 
of Utah, hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as the 'Premises1, to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 31 to 36, both 
inclusive, together with the East 10.5 feet 
of the vacated alley adjacent on the West, 
Block 26, Nelson Park Addition in Qgden 
City. 
Subject to joint use with other tenants of 
Lessor of parking area, rights of way and 
driveways other than drive-in window exits 
and approaches. 
-11-
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PARCEL 2: Together with.joint use with 
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000 
square feet of additional parking area, 
right of way and driveway area located on 
Lots 25 to 30, inclusive of said Block 26, 
and upon property adjacent thereto on West." 
This language evidences an intention of Lessor to 
develop the property and have other tenants with joint 
uses of parking, right of way and driveway. 
Parcel 1 was adequate for Commercial's parking 
needs (R131), but it desired ingress and egress to 
and from 36th Street as well as Harrison (R114,131), 
and additional parking area reserved so that the 
Blairs wouldn't build on all of the remaining property. 
(R114,131) . 
Woodbury prepared the description for Parcel 2, 
and sought to describe it in such a manner that it 
went to 36th Street and included the Blair property 
West of Lots 25 to 30 (R130,144,145) 
Since the Blairs would not sign the lease with 
the Earnest Money language regarding the additional 
parking, (150' x 140' South of Parcel 1), the 
compromise language was worked out after a long 
period of negotiations (R131). The Blairs did not 
intend to reserve the Southeast corner for parking 
and this intent was discussed with Commercial (R135). 
-12-
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Referring to this cornert Woodbury testified: 
"I'm sure, Mr. Campbell, there was a discussion 
from the beginning with the bank. First, they 
(wanted) their own building there. After that, 
they didn't want to be obstructed. But it's 
my recollection that when the Blairs wouldn't 
go along and they knew that I was going to try 
to develop the rest, and that I was adamant 
about not having buildings on the corner, it's 
my recollection that they decided to take their 
chances and go and that they expected hopefully 
that nothing would ever interfere, and in any 
case (certainly) a goodly portion of it had to 
be reserved for parking." 
The lease at paragraph 5 provided: 
"Lessor shall install asphalt surfacing and 
paint parking lines over portions of the 
entire premises designated as parking and 
drive areas, and Lessee shall pay Lessor a 
pro-rata share of the cost such that Lessee 
ultimately pays the surfacing and lining costs 
of the Parcel 1, plus approaches thereto over 
public property to the East of Parcel 1. 
Lessor shall complete surfacing of Parcel 
1 and Parcel 2 at or near the same time, such 
that the entire area will be available for use 
at substantially the same time." 
The driveway approach on 36th Street presumably 
was located as required by the City, to the West of 
Harrison so as to not interfere with traffic and 
lined up with an extension of the vacated alley portion 
of Parcel 1. In excess of 20,000 square feet of 
additional parking area was asphalted at the time of 
-13-
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construction of the bank facility as required hy the 
lease and as a matter of convenience for the Blairs 
at that time was located in the Southeast area of 
their property, extending to 36th Street, covering 
Lots 25 to 30# the lot marked N and half of the 
vacated alley on the West (R83). 
At this time# the Blairs had not settled on a plan 
for the development of the remainder of their property 
and the permanent location of the additional parking 
area was not then, nor has it now been finally fixed. 
In 1965, Blair was contacted by a gasoline 
company about leasing a part of the Southeast corner, 
resulting in Commercial contacting Blair by letter 
(Exhibit E) stating that the Southeast corner was 
reserved for parking. Blair responded verbally and 
stated his understanding of the lease provision 
(R89) and again with regard to Commercial's letter on 
American Savings (Exhibit F ) , Blair responded 
verbally stating he was under no obligation by law 
to discuss development plans with the bank (R94). 
Blair has maintained from the beginning that 
there was continuing flexibility in the location of 
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the additional easement areas,so as to be compatible 
with the expected building development on the remain-
der of the property. A position Commercial was well 
aware of prior to signing the lease and a position 
Commercial accepted. 
POINT III 
•kJck-k-k * * * * 
THE COURTS FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Blairs have on going plans to develop their 
property and acquire tenants. Presumptively because 
of set back and side yard requirements, if a building were 
located on the southeast corner, not all of the land 
area would be covered by the structure. Nonetheless, 
Lots 25 to 30 were not committed exclusively for 
parking. The Blairs desired flexibility, Until they 
knew how their remaining land was to be developed, 
they were not willing to commit the southeast corner 
or any specific part for parking (R149,169). 
Commercial knew of this prior to signing the 
lease and took its chances. Woodbury sought to place 
this intent and understanding in the lease. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appears that there is ample evidence in the 
record to establish that Parcel 2 covers the south 
half of the Blair parcel over to 36th Street; that 
the Blairs desired flexibility in the location of the 
20,000 square feet on Parcel 2 and until their land 
was developed they were not willing to finally commit 
any specific portion to parking and easements; that 
Commercial knew of these positions and was willing to 
take its chances; and that Woodbury sought to incorpor-
ate these concepts into the lease. 
The judgment and decree of the trial Court ought 
to be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
LA VAR E. STARK 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent Blair 
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